The NATS official Rust clients are vulnerable to MitM when using TLS.
A fix for the nats crate hasn't been released yet. Since the nats crate is going to be deprecated anyway, consider switching to async-nats >= 0.29 which already fixed this vulnerability.
The common name of the server's TLS certificate is validated against the hostname provided by the server's plaintext INFO message during the initial connection setup phase. A MitM proxy can tamper with the host field's value by substituting it with the common name of a valid certificate it controls, fooling the client into accepting it.
INFO messageINFO, alters the host JSON field and passes the tampered INFO back to the clienthost was set to the common name of said certificaterustls accepts the certificate, having verified that the common name matches the attacker-controlled value it was given{
"nvd_published_at": null,
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-27T21:12:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
]
}