In shared Slack workspace deployments that rely on sender restrictions (allowFrom, DM policy, or channel user allowlists), some interactive callbacks (block_action, view_submission, view_closed) could be accepted before full sender authorization checks.
In that scenario, an unauthorized workspace member could enqueue system-event text into an active session. This issue did not provide unauthenticated access, cross-gateway isolation bypass, or host-level privilege escalation by itself.
openclaw (npm)<= 2026.2.242026.2.25 (planned next npm release)ce8c67c314b93f570f53c2a9abc124e1e3a54715patched_versions is pre-set to the release (2026.2.25). Advisory published with npm release 2026.2.25.
OpenClaw does not support adversarial multi-user isolation on a single shared gateway instance. The supported model is one trust boundary per gateway (separate gateways/hosts for mutually untrusted users). See: https://docs.openclaw.ai/gateway/security
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
{
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T18:55:19Z",
"github_reviewed": true,
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
}