Embedded font-family names (word/fontTable.xml) were interpolated unescaped into an injected @font-face <style> and into the print window's document.write(). A crafted name injects page-wide CSS on open, and breaks out of <style>
into executable HTML on Print.
Opening a crafted .docx applies attacker-controlled CSS page-wide with zero clicks (overlay/phishing, attribute-selector exfiltration of input values, tracking beacons). Clicking Print escalates to script execution in the embedder's origin.
Upgrade to 1.8.3. Font names are CSS-escaped before interpolation (quotes, backslash, < >, and CSS newlines), and the print window is assembled with DOM APIs instead of document.write.
{
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-10T15:06:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
}