GHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43

Suggest an improvement
Source
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43
Import Source
https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43/GHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43
Aliases
Published
2026-11-19T16:05:07Z
Modified
2026-11-19T16:15:03Z
Severity
  • 6.9 (Medium) CVSS_V4 - CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N CVSS Calculator
Summary
Mareforma: transparency_logged trusts the unsigned rekor block
Details

What's wrong

During restore, transparency_logged is recomputed as 1 if (toml_logged is not False and bundle_has_rekor) else 0, where bundle_has_rekor comes only from a rekor.uuid field inside signature_bundle. That derivation is wrong in both directions.

First, the rekor block is metadata attached after signing (attach_rekor_entry in mareforma/signing/rekor.py leaves the payload and signatures untouched), so it is not covered by the Ed25519 signature. A hand-edited claims.toml can add "rekor": {"uuid": "x"} to any claim's bundle and forge the "publicly witnessed by Rekor" state. The claim signature still verifies, and restore never cross-checks the block against [rekor_inclusions] or the log. Tampering with claims.toml is the exact threat model restore defends against; _verify_claim_signatures_on_restore checks only payload and signatures.

Second, a signed claim in a graph that never used Rekor is written with transparency_logged=1 (the column default when Rekor is disabled) but restores as 0 because its bundle has no rekor block. The convergence gate requires transparency_logged = 1, so post-restore peers can no longer converge to REPLICATED. With no rekor_url configured, refresh_unsigned() is a no-op and the flag stays 0 forever. Observed on the honest path: signed non-Rekor claim restores from transparency_logged=1 to 0, and a subsequent peer stays at PRELIMINARY instead of converging.

Severity and impact

High. An attacker who edits claims.toml can mark claims Rekor-witnessed and REPLICATED-eligible without them ever having been logged. Meanwhile the common honest configuration (signed, no Rekor) has its trust state silently degraded by every catastrophic-loss restore, with no recovery path.

Location

  • mareforma/db/restore.py:376 reads toml_logged from the TOML and probes the bundle for a rekor.uuid
  • mareforma/db/restore.py:385 computes resolved_transparency from the unsigned rekor block alone
  • mareforma/db/core.py:1401 the REPLICATED convergence gate requires c.transparency_logged = 1

Fix direction

Do not derive transparency_logged from an unsigned envelope field. When a rekor block is present, require a matching, cryptographically verified [rekor_inclusions] entry (via verify_rekor_inclusion against the pinned log public key) whose hashedrekord spec.data.hash equals the SHA-256 of the claim's signed payload before setting 1; otherwise set 0.

When the claim is signed and neither the bundle nor the graph carries Rekor coordinates, restore the write-time value: the TOML omits transparency_logged unless it was 0, so treat an absent flag plus no rekor bundle as 1 (the column default for non-Rekor writes).

Do red/green TDD: add a regression test that fails on main, then make it pass.

Quality bar

SOLID, DRY, KISS. Clean, readable, well-tested code. No new errors, warnings, or test failures; the full suite stays green on all supported Python versions.

Database specific
{
    "cwe_ids": [
        "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T16:05:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-18T23:17:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
}
References

Affected packages

PyPI / mareforma

Package

Affected ranges

Type
ECOSYSTEM
Events
Introduced
0.3.0
Fixed
0.3.8

Affected versions

0.*
0.3.0
0.3.1
0.3.2
0.3.3
0.3.4
0.3.5
0.3.6
0.3.7

Database specific

source
"https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/11/GHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43/GHSA-xfq4-8hf9-5h43.json"