GHSA-xj4f-8jjg-vx4q

Impact

The ConceptReferenceRangeUtility.evaluateCriteria() method in OpenMRS Core evaluates database-stored criteria strings as Apache Velocity templates without any sandbox configuration. The VelocityEngine is initialized with only logging properties and noSecureUberspector, leaving the default UberspectImpl in place, which allows unrestricted Java reflection through template expressions.

A user with the Manage Concepts privilege can store a malicious Velocity template expression in a concept's reference range criteria field. This payload is then executed automatically whenever a user or API call validates an observation against the affected concept. The Velocity context exposes $patient (the Person / Patient object), $obs (the Obs object), and $fn (the ConceptReferenceRangeUtility instance with access to the full OpenMRS service layer).

Persistent Remote Code Execution: The payload persists in the concept_reference_range database table (VARCHAR 65535). A single compromised concept for a common clinical measurement executes the payload on every subsequent observation validation across all users, API clients, and integrations in the facility.

Privilege Escalation: The Manage Concepts privilege is a content-management function, defined as "Able to add/edit/delete concept entries", not an administrative privilege. Multiple non-admin staff per facility typically hold this privilege. The attacker escalates from concept dictionary management to arbitrary code execution as the Tomcat application server process.

PHI Exfiltration: The Velocity context objects directly expose patient data without requiring OS-level RCE.

Patches

This is fixed in 2.8.6 and 2.7.9 as well as future versions.

Workarounds

Ensure the Manage Concepts privilege is restricted to only authorized users and carefully audit any ConceptReferenceRanges in the database.

Resources

https://github.com/openmrs/openmrs-core/commit/8d1c193 https://www.machinespirits.com/advisory/1e8430/