OpenClaw's exec-approvals allowlist supports a small set of "safe bins" intended to be stdin-only (no positional file arguments) when running tools.exec.host=gateway|node with security=allowlist.
In affected configurations, the allowlist validation checked pre-expansion argv tokens, but execution used a real shell (sh -c) which expands globs and environment variables. This allowed safe bins like head, tail, or grep to read arbitrary local files via tokens such as * or $HOME/... without triggering approvals.
This issue is configuration-dependent and is not exercised by default settings (default tools.exec.host is sandbox).
openclaw (npm)<= 2026.2.13>= 2026.2.14 (planned; publish the advisory after the npm release is out)An authorized but untrusted caller (or prompt-injection) could cause the gateway/node process to disclose files readable by that process when host execution is enabled in allowlist mode.
Safe-bins executions now force argv tokens to be treated as literal text at execution time (single-quoted), preventing globbing and $VARS expansion from turning "safe" tokens into file paths.
patched_versions is pre-set for the next planned release (>= 2026.2.14) so publishing is a single click once that npm version is available.
Thanks @christos-eth for reporting.
{
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T00:50:47Z",
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"severity": "HIGH",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:19Z"
}