GO-2026-5119

Source
https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-5119
Import Source
https://vuln.go.dev/ID/GO-2026-5119.json
JSON Data
https://api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/GO-2026-5119
Aliases
Published
2026-08-11T20:19:48Z
Modified
2026-08-11T20:45:07Z
Summary
Nezha's authenticated agents can forge service-monitor results for other users' services in github.com/nezhahq/nezha
Details

Nezha accepts service-monitor TaskResult messages from an authenticated agent based only on whether the reported service ID exists. The dashboard authenticates the agent and derives the reporter server ID from the gRPC stream, but the service-monitor result worker does not verify that the reporter server was selected for that service, belongs to the service owner, or was actually assigned that monitoring task.

A low-privilege user with a valid agent secret and one registered agent can submit forged monitoring results for another user's service ID. This allows cross-tenant corruption of service-monitor history and state, and can influence victim-owned service notifications.

Database specific
{
    "review_status": "REVIEWED",
    "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-5119"
}
References

Affected packages

Go / github.com/naiba/nezha

Package

Name
github.com/naiba/nezha
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:golang/github.com/naiba/nezha

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
0.20.0

Database specific

source
"https://vuln.go.dev/ID/GO-2026-5119.json"

Go / github.com/nezhahq/nezha

Package

Name
github.com/nezhahq/nezha
View open source insights on deps.dev
Purl
pkg:golang/github.com/nezhahq/nezha

Affected ranges

Type
SEMVER
Events
Introduced
1.0.0
Fixed
1.14.15-0.20260521020202-02129f16fb15

Ecosystem specific

{
    "imports": [
        {
            "path": "github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/rpc"
        },
        {
            "path": "github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
        }
    ]
}

Database specific

source
"https://vuln.go.dev/ID/GO-2026-5119.json"