JuicyPixels contains independent out-of-bounds writes reachable from ordinary
image decoding (Codec.Picture.decodeImage and the format-specific decoders):
BI_RLE8/BI_RLE4 (Codec.Picture.Bitmap.decodeImageY8RLE): the
pixel buffer size is computed with 32-bit Int32 arithmetic and wraps to a
zero-length allocation for large headers; end-of-line and vertical-delta
control codes move the destination cursor without a bound, and the
horizontal delta jump is unclamped. Every run writes attacker-chosen bytes
through M.unsafeWrite at the cursor position — negative offsets before
the raster, arbitrary offsets against a wrapped allocation, and up to 255
bytes past it.Codec.Picture.Tiff.gatherStrips, copyByteString, unpackPackBit):
strip copies have no destination bound and the per-strip size computation
wraps negative for strips starting past the raster, so excess strips copy
attacker-chosen bytes past the end of the allocated raster.Impact: heap memory adjacent to the decoded image is corrupted with
attacker-selected values and offsets through maliciously crafted BMP or TIFF
files. Beyond corruption, exploitation primitives were demonstrated
end-to-end on GHC 9.6 / linux-amd64: a crafted BMP deterministically crashed
the process via the wrapped allocation; against a warp-based service a single
uploaded BMP overwrote another request's in-memory session blob, observed in
the victim's own HTTP response (12 of 12 cycles); and with heap grooming the
write primitive was used to redirect a lazily-evaluated top-level String
passed to callCommand, executing attacker-supplied commands (3 of 3 runs).
These are relative-offset primitives: the demonstrated RCE depends on heap
layout and linkage and is not a guaranteed arbitrary-address write.
The fix, released in 3.3.10, validates the declared pixel count centrally in
decodeBitmapWithPaletteAndMetadata (cap 2^29 pixels, i.e. 2 GiB of RGBA8),
computes all decoder buffer sizes in exact 64-bit Int arithmetic, clips
out-of-bounds BMP RLE writes to the raster (zero-filling skipped pixels,
matching the clipping behaviour of the non-RLE decoders and the Windows WIC
decoder), bounds TIFF strip copies at the destination buffer, and clamps
strip counts at the raster boundary. Malformed-but-decodable files keep
decoding instead of failing.
Residual risk in 3.3.10: the shared GIF/TIFF LZW decoder
(Codec.Picture.Gif.Internal.LZW) retains an unguarded single-byte
KwKwK write reachable from the same TIFF/GIF decode paths; it is
documented as a follow-up and is not addressed by this release.
Credit: external vulnerability report by Akash Sebastian (@akashseb) and Tomer Fichman (irregular).
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