MAL-2026-10766

The syft-acp-uikit package was published to the npm registry by user 'ada8877' (maintainer email k3mlol@proton.me) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the 'syft-acp' internal/private package naming convention (an ACP component library) of a target organization, so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency.

The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io.

Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical to the earlier 'click2ai' campaign, sharing the same Sentry organization (o4510485815754752) and a related ProtonMail maintainer identity, and differs only in the package name and target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511744089718784.

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Source: amazon-inspector (694d28b5d3d4fc19b2dc3399b982cc5333b4bc73fcdd45754194e9689737ee18)

The package declares a preinstall script that runs examples/verify.js, which initializes @sentry/node against a hardcoded author-controlled Sentry DSN (https://e82e1244d311e1f83fd57d89db4d62a3@o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511744089718784), fetches the installer's public egress IP via https://www.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/trace, triggers an error, and flushes a Sentry event carrying the resolved IP to the author's project on every npm install. src/index.js additionally hardcodes the same DSN as DEFAULT_DSN and sets sendDefaultPii: true, so consumers who call init() without an explicit dsn silently route their captured error events and PII to the same author-controlled destination. The package name evokes the unrelated 'syft' ecosystem and a UI toolkit while its actual code is a thin Sentry wrapper against an author-owned DSN, and the README is a two-line stub — a name/behavior mismatch consistent with an impersonation lure.