MAL-2026-11551

npm/@adminide-stack/clock-tik-browser is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (cebd524425b56b932976f4f044e8ca099d9ba909049988ddc9285aa0fc495efb)

The package declares a preinstall lifecycle script (node setup.mjs) that fires automatically on npm install. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (hex _0xNNNN identifiers, string-property indirection maps), fetches the Bun runtime from oven-sh's official releases, and then invokes the downloaded Bun binary via execFileSync to run a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a ~727KB Bun-compiled bundle (header // @bun @bun-cjs) using string-array rotation obfuscation and is not human-inspectable. The advertised purpose of the package is a browser/React clock utility, which has no legitimate need to fetch an alternate language runtime at install time and use it to execute an opaque sibling bundle. Fetching Bun from its official source is being used as an evasion technique: the actual payload runs under a freshly-downloaded runtime that bypasses Node-based supply-chain scanners, and the executed content is the shipped obfuscated blob rather than the runtime itself. This is an alternate-runtime dropper pattern executing attacker-controlled code on the installer's machine at install time.