MAL-2026-11586

npm/@nebula.js/theme is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (f7cbadb620cd0896a1784f30da92ca721d24d5009fdc32119172b96075d20a1f)

package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs is an obfuscated script (obfuscator.io-style 0x-named identifiers and dispatch-object control flow) that downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases, extracts it to a temporary directory, sets it executable, and uses it to run a bundled sibling file mathinit.js via execFileSync. mathinit.js is a ~727KB single-line, heavily obfuscated JavaScript bundle (large numeric string-array table with function-permutation dispatch, e.g. WV8StW), delivered under the '// @bun @bun-cjs' header so it runs under the freshly downloaded Bun runtime rather than Node. The alternate-runtime-dropper shape moves execution outside Node-based tooling visibility. The package presents itself as '@nebula.js/theme' with author 'QlikTech International AB' — a namespace matching Qlik's real nebula.js packages — but the upstream Qlik theme library has no such preinstall step and no Bun dependency. package.json declares files: ['dist'], yet setup.mjs and mathinit.js are smuggled into the tarball root outside that allowlist. On npm install, arbitrary attacker-controlled code from math_init.js executes on the installer's host under a runtime the package fetched itself.

Source: ghsa-malware (0b82a8a792115a5897a01e5eeb87893a6ba3991e2f5a2a35e70cbf4c1d033ae5)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.