MAL-2026-11590

npm/@onereach/billing-shared is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (f94098f6130769101e9e1b8e3b55d0d8ef4a8ed71eb533168e2ea38cc7797edb)

The package declares a preinstall hook (node setup.mjs) that runs automatically on npm install. setup.mjs is variable-name-obfuscated and constructs a URL of the form https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<ver>/<archive>.zip, downloads the Bun runtime, unzips it, chmods the binary 0o755, and then invokes execFileSync(bun_path, [<math_init.js>]). The sibling math_init.js is a single-line ~727KB opaque bundle starting with // @bun @bun-cjs, using a string-array rotation function and a multi-thousand-entry integer/char lookup table (canonical string-array-shuffle obfuscation). math_init.js is not referenced from the package's dist/ Node sources — it is reachable only via the preinstall Bun invocation, meaning its contents never appear in the Node module graph and are executed exclusively by the freshly-dropped alternate runtime. The advertised purpose of the package is CSV/enum billing helpers, which has no need for a bundled Bun runtime or a 727KB opaque payload. The combination of an install-time alternate-runtime drop, wrapper obfuscation, and an opaque obfuscated payload executed under that dropped runtime is a supply-chain dropper: npm install of this version runs attacker-supplied, intentionally hidden code on the installer's machine.

Source: ghsa-malware (cd9e78f87e5abd3d49de90c310170e4ebd23cdec86bcca7ae1ca144fa2d9d432)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.