MAL-2026-11599

npm/@onereach/font-icons is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (985dab3052de2437be618139b3308eea1bc2c71574881a45a3f94b7c0fc93281)

The package advertises itself as a static SVG-to-TTF icon-font generator, but its declared preinstall hook (node setup.mjs) fetches the Bun runtime from oven-sh/bun releases into a temporary directory, chmods it executable, and uses it to run math_init.js, a 727,680-byte Bun-compiled bundle shipped in the tarball. math_init.js is heavily obfuscated with rotated string-array shuffling (the WV8StW shift routine, a large mixed-type constant table, mangled identifiers), making its behavior opaque to inspection. The preinstall dropper setup.mjs is itself obfuscated with hex-name identifiers (_0x488df8, _0x52943e) and per-function inline string-lookup tables — the shape produced by obfuscator.io — hiding method names, platform strings (musl, --version), and control flow. Installing an alternate runtime at preinstall solely to execute a bundled opaque payload bypasses scanners that inspect only Node-resolved code, and none of an icon-font generator's documented functionality requires a Bun runtime or an obfuscated Bun bundle. On npm install, arbitrary code from the obfuscated bundle runs on the installer's host under the freshly downloaded Bun binary.

Source: ghsa-malware (b8f6871bfe326e0947ed897ab8d56fa73df06b31ecc93a4a9aa1ec106f549c49)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.