MAL-2026-11609

npm/@onereach/or-browser-next is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (d957e8076cf64a8e20ab4c51a09d2784f289267922a7bb699333bcad660f1bbe)

The package's preinstall script (node setup.mjs) downloads the Bun runtime from GitHub releases (oven-sh/bun), extracts it to a temporary directory, marks it executable, and then invokes it against math_init.js, a 727 KB single-line JavaScript file shipped in the tarball that is heavily obfuscated with a rotating string-array and hex-named identifiers over a custom decoder alphabet. Before the download, setup.mjs fingerprints the host by running ldd --version and reading /etc/os-release to detect musl/Alpine and by combining process.platform and process.arch to select one of six platform-specific Bun binaries (linux-x64/arm64 glibc and musl, darwin-x64/arm64, win32-x64/arm64), so the install-time execution succeeds uniformly on Linux, macOS, and Windows developer and CI hosts. If Bun is already present on PATH it is invoked directly. The package presents itself as a Vue UI component for browsing files; that stated purpose does not require an alternate language runtime or an obfuscated blob, and the payload's contents are hidden from Node-based tooling because they only execute inside the fetched Bun binary. This is the alternate-runtime-dropper shape: at npm install time the package fetches a separate runtime and uses it to execute an opaque, obfuscated payload bundled in the tarball.

Source: ghsa-malware (aad1fb07bb260797b2afb853b1ae8ed67ec2775eb2d3174c8538342a3ad47a3d)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.