MAL-2026-11610

npm/@onereach/or-content-builder-renderer is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (ee343d6dc29791c1ae27514e9e112526f553299af49f9245d0171a8a64cd16d2)

This package (advertised as a Vue file-browser/content-builder renderer component) declares a preinstall hook node setup.mjs that, when no local bun binary is present, downloads the Bun runtime zip for the installer's platform/architecture from oven-sh's GitHub releases, unpacks it to a temp directory, chmods the binary executable, and then invokes bun <pkg>/math_init.js on install. math_init.js is a ~727KB heavily obfuscated file at the tarball root (shuffled string-array with a push(shift()) rotator, integer-encoded string table, hex-mangled identifiers, custom decoder over a mixed alphabet, @bun @bun-cjs header). The file is not listed in package.json's declared files array (which enumerates only dist and src), so it is smuggled into the tarball outside the author-declared manifest. Executing an opaque obfuscated blob under a freshly downloaded alternate runtime bears no relation to a Vue UI component's declared purpose and evades Node-based scanners. Result: arbitrary attacker-controlled code executes on the installer's machine automatically on npm install.

Source: ghsa-malware (ebf47053848ab7290582f7749922907e07d514ab1bd149ea7656777af8aec292)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.