MAL-2026-11627

npm/@onereach/salesforce-miaw-client is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (df5aaceb2f852a1b48658a1b698ef2bfa9c9acd29136ed2fbb94ae4e3896968c)

package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs uses obfuscated _0x... identifiers and, on npm install, downloads a Bun runtime archive from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases into a temporary directory, extracts and chmods it, then invokes the dropped Bun binary against a sibling file mathinit.js at the package root. mathinit.js is a ~727KB Bun-compiled (// @bun @bun-cjs) bundle with obfuscator.io-style string-array + rotate obfuscation (function WV8StW rotating a ~1000-entry mixed number/string array, mangled identifiers like MmgoCP, etDiOOB, JqTtnbZ). The name mathinit.js has no relation to the advertised Salesforce Messaging-for-In-App-and-Web HTTP client purpose. package.json declares files: ["dist"], yet setup.mjs and the 727KB mathinit.js are shipped at the tarball root outside that allowlist, so the payload is not surfaced in the declared manifest and is wired in only through the preinstall lifecycle hook. Executing the payload under Bun places it outside Node's tooling visibility, defeating Node-based supply-chain and runtime scanners. The combination — install-time fetch of a second language runtime, execution of a heavily obfuscated bundle unrelated to the package's stated purpose, and payload smuggling outside the declared files list — is arbitrary code execution on any host running npm install on this version.

Source: ghsa-malware (b1fb559d97bebc677040ca042a431fce92863b38b60c5ffe64f9181b28a764bd)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.