MAL-2026-11628

npm/@onereach/si-a-button is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (8e426363a6358b0eee89f7eb6e98ad6498730bd61299c179a3e9dcc4dd2f4dff)

The package advertises itself as a small Vue button component but declares a preinstall script (node setup.mjs) that, on npm install, probes for bun on PATH and otherwise downloads the Bun runtime from GitHub releases for the detected platform/architecture (with Alpine/musl detection via ldd and /etc/os-release), unzips it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it against a sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB heavily obfuscated @bun-cjs single-expression bundle using shuffled string arrays and function-array rotation (WV8StW), with no relation to a UI button component. The setup.mjs loader itself is also obfuscated with _0xNNNNNN identifier renaming and string-indirection tables typical of obfuscator.io output. The combination of an alternate-runtime dropper (pulling Bun specifically to execute code that Node-focused scanners will not read) with a large obfuscated sibling payload whose name and content are unrelated to the package's stated purpose is a supply-chain attack shape: installing this package runs arbitrary attacker-authored code on the installer's host at install time.

Source: ghsa-malware (c2a209321993407715d59585c775e2a820e71d8eace47e65af28c930f0be5363)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.