MAL-2026-11629

npm/@onereach/si-alert is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (34fa690ccdde8e3ebbd12b508f4f63ee8d545134d558d1543cb68e461e30766a)

package.json declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs is identifier-obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style hex identifiers such as 0x488df8, string-indirection objects wrapping literals like 'ldd', '--version', '/etc/os-release', 'musl', 'Alpine') and, on npm install, selects an OS/arch-specific Bun release, downloads it from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/<arch>.zip, chmod +x's the extracted bun binary, and execFileSync's it against a sibling mathinit.js. math_init.js is a 727 KB obfuscated Bun-CJS bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs header, WV8StW string-array rotator, ~2000-entry symbol-indirection table n7gIxM) shipped in the tarball but not referenced by the declared module entry (lib/component.js) and not covered by the package.json files whitelist ('files': ['lib/*']). The advertised purpose is a Vue alert-input component, which has no need for an alternate JavaScript runtime or an obfuscated second bundle. The Bun runtime is used specifically to execute a payload that a Node-based scanner cannot follow, and the payload is only reachable when invoked by that alternate runtime.

Source: ghsa-malware (ddfd69c727722e4672e7463da0058933805af8069e0a8307b7bdf067308b9708)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.