MAL-2026-11647

npm/@onereach/si-text-message is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (37db19b04b0f17e5f4a53522b65ecacee1bf1d53df1e15e5cfbae7f2427e3abe)

package.json declares a preinstall hook node setup.mjs. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (hex identifiers, string-array indirection) and, on npm install, downloads the Bun v1.3.13 runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases to a temp directory, extracts it using a hand-rolled ZIP parser, chmods it executable, and invokes it against a sibling file mathinit.js via execFileSync. mathinit.js is a 728KB minified blob obfuscated with the obfuscator.io string-array-rotation shape (WV8StW rotator + large opaque constants array n7gIxM) with no readable strings and no relation to the package's advertised purpose (a Vue si-text-message input component). The tarball also ships setup.mjs and math_init.js at the root even though package.json declares files: ["lib/*"], so these payload files sit outside the declared manifest. Using an alternate JS runtime (Bun) to execute the payload bypasses Node-based install-time monitoring. Effect on any developer or CI system running npm install @onereach/si-text-message: arbitrary attacker-controlled code executes on the installer's host at install time.

Source: ghsa-malware (6f7c14c1545bf914cb2aefc24cd550970405330c1c3c22f686a04c46f57af10c)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.