MAL-2026-11649

npm/@onereach/si-validated-timestring-input is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (2410a71b885ad690abafcc5e31c0c72478abef21e15daa64581ef618e49ec5ca)

The package's preinstall lifecycle (node setup.mjs) downloads the Bun runtime binary from GitHub's oven-sh/bun releases (pinned to v1.3.13), chmods it executable, and executes it against a sibling file math_init.js inside the package directory. math_init.js is a ~728KB heavily obfuscated bundle (string-array rotation via WV8StW, hex-obfuscated _0x... identifiers, encoded literal table n7gIxM, custom base64-like alphabet decoder hc1jfK9) carrying a @bun/@bun-cjs header, and is not referenced by any of the package's library exports — it is only reached through the preinstall Bun invocation. setup.mjs itself uses hex-obfuscated identifiers and string-array indirection. The advertised purpose is a Vue timestring input component, which has no legitimate need for an alternate JavaScript runtime at install time. package.json declares "files": ["lib/*"], but both setup.mjs and math_init.js ship at the tarball root outside that whitelist. This is the alternate-runtime-dropper shape: shipping an obfuscated payload that only executes under a freshly-downloaded alien runtime, bypassing Node-based inspection, and running arbitrary attacker code on every machine that runs npm install for this package.

Source: ghsa-malware (644744175b28e81678c0462e65c469c60aa685cf92c0d1e4ac04896209b20f4f)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.