MAL-2026-11651

npm/@onereach/ssml-editor is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (bb037b5004e5ddb812fe8e29e71ca9c2cb3f7acdd39ca9b1b7ede4b9070341bf)

@onereach/ssml-editor advertises itself as a Vue SSML editor component but declares an npm preinstall hook (node setup.mjs) that, on every npm install, downloads a platform-specific Bun runtime archive from oven-sh/bun GitHub releases (v1.3.13), extracts it, chmods it executable, and then invokes that freshly-downloaded Bun binary via execFileSync to run a bundled 727KB file math_init.js. math_init.js is a Bun-compiled bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs header) with string-array rotation obfuscation (a WV8StW shift routine and a large n7gIxM numeric constant table) and a minified single-line body; it is not referenced by the package's stated Vue entry (src/App.vue) and is only reachable through setup.mjs and the downloaded Bun runtime. A Vue UI component has no legitimate need to fetch a second JavaScript runtime and use it to execute an opaque obfuscated blob at install time. The combination — install-time fetch of an alternate runtime + execution of a shipped, purpose-mismatched, heavily-obfuscated payload under that runtime — grants arbitrary code execution on any developer or CI machine that installs this version.

Source: ghsa-malware (6205775eeec551e67f00256d5788f8c95be41c28f3ee3d5039715a5a2c9f9e61)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.