MAL-2026-11655

npm/@onereach/step-voice is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (44111716a3e4a02f9ac39d153dbcd05d911c0c39a835ac2b6592686df232ec5a)

@onereach/step-voice 7.0.32 ships a preinstall hook (node setup.mjs) that, on npm install, downloads the Bun runtime from oven-sh's GitHub release for v1.3.13, then uses that Bun binary to execute a sibling file math_init.js (727 KB) via execFileSync(bunPath, [math_init.js]). setup.mjs itself is obfuscated with _0x... hex-suffixed identifiers and dictionary-indirection to hide its network and process calls. math_init.js is a Bun-compiled bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs header) with a shuffled numeric constant array and an index-rotation decoder — an opaque payload that is not human-inspectable as Node source and whose filename is unrelated to the package's declared purpose (Onereach.ai voice-conversation steps). Integrity signals compound the concern: package.json declares files: ["/dst"] (only the dst/ directory should be published) yet the tarball root contains both setup.mjs and math_init.js; the declared main: index.js does not exist in the tarball. The delivery shape — install-time fetch of an alternate runtime used to execute an adjacent obfuscated compiled blob unrelated to the package's purpose — is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern.

Source: ghsa-malware (08e4dae9b5627ad354ac1cc3c6e0e92ec321bb2f8b730fbe8df5e65ce22767df)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.