MAL-2026-11657

npm/@onereach/time-interpreter is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (b61b0801d2c8440881af997d904522e0c11ecb67187ca3636e14811069a72803)

The package declares scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs". setup.mjs is itself written with obfuscator.io-style identifier and string-array obfuscation (_0x488df8, _0x52943e, per-function lookup objects hiding trivial constants). At install time it downloads the Bun runtime binary from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases (v1.3.13) into a temp directory, marks it executable, and invokes it via execFileSync against the package-local mathinit.js. mathinit.js is a ~727KB single-line file tagged // @bun @bun-cjs with heavy string-array-shift obfuscation (rotator function WV8StW, giant mixed number/string array n7gIxM, mangled identifiers), meaning it will not execute under Node and is intended to run only under the freshly dropped Bun runtime. The advertised purpose is date/duration parsing, which requires neither an alternate language runtime nor an opaque bundled payload. The combination — obfuscated lifecycle script + alternate-runtime download + execution of an opaque bundled blob under that alternate runtime on every npm install — is an alternate-runtime dropper that runs attacker-controlled, unreviewable code on the installer's machine before any application code sees it, and it is structured to evade Node-based static and dynamic review.

Source: ghsa-malware (4f34d293ee5a9816e61d3db0be22e45070ff34ccc045a7c6377a77c27b905cdc)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.