MAL-2026-11659

npm/@onereach/types-contacts-api is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (f0fb906fd4c7d44b0d79bd2f614eb99ba5da8201239754957a5d4855fe8e9bcb)

@onereach/types-contacts-api is advertised as a TypeScript type-definitions package but ships a preinstall hook (node setup.mjs) that automatically fires on npm install. setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>/<arch>.zip and then invokes the downloaded bun binary against a 727 KB payload shipped in the tarball, math_init.js (execFileSync(bunPath, [join(D, 'math_init.js')])). math_init.js is a Bun-CJS bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs) obfuscated with a rotated string-array decoder (function WV8StW(...){ for(...) MmgoCP.push(MmgoCP.shift()); return MmgoCP } over a large mixed number/string constant array). setup.mjs itself is also identifier-obfuscated (_0x488df8, _0x52943e, string-lookup indirection like YCZJE: function(...){ return...(...) }) to hide the literal command names, paths, and URLs it uses. A type-definitions package has no legitimate need for an alternate language runtime, an obfuscated install script, or a large obfuscated executable at install time; the payload is deliberately scoped to run under Bun so Node-based scanners cannot inspect it. Installing this package causes an installer-side host to execute obfuscated attacker-controlled code under a freshly downloaded runtime.

Source: ghsa-malware (9194c08c67bd6859072dc4165d1eb8f3d423a6d0aaa1d67a11b2785f3e3467cd)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.