MAL-2026-11664

npm/@onereach/webform is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (113be584ef9e521b45f41e2c1ab1e96b0f3a19e3c90f02755e83dc7312c7fc25)

package.json sets scripts.preinstall to node setup.mjs. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated with obfuscator.io 0x identifiers and, at npm install time, constructs a URL of the form https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<VER>/<archive>.zip, downloads a Bun runtime archive, unzips it to a temporary directory, marks the binary executable, and then invokes it via execFileSync against the sibling file mathinit.js. mathinit.js is a ~727KB // @bun @bun-cjs bundle with an obfuscator.io shuffled numeric string array (n7gIxM), hex-prefixed identifiers, and a rotation function — its body is not human-readable and it is not referenced from any file under src/. The file name is unrelated to the package's stated Vue webform purpose. The CHANGELOG's last entry is 0.3.1 (2021-07-05) with no mention of Bun, mathinit, or a preinstall step, while the published 0.3.15 tarball ships setup.mjs and math_init.js at the root with no files allowlist in package.json. The alternate-runtime path (executing the obfuscated bundle under a freshly downloaded Bun rather than Node) is structured to evade Node-based static inspection of the code that actually runs.

Source: ghsa-malware (4e9bb9a9a8630d0ae78d29c0501004728a5a5f97a2e6c89afd3bfbe524c307ed)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.