MAL-2026-11665

npm/@or-sdk/account-settings is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (efc4126d27f1f5341a9a4665d086bec434e2cbdbe9cc9f3522c4b71705e20804)

The package's declared preinstall hook node setup.mjs fetches the Bun runtime archive from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<version>.zip, extracts and chmods the Bun binary in a temp directory, and then uses that Bun binary to execute a bundled 727 KB math_init.js via execFileSync(bunPath, [math_init.js], {cwd: D}). math_init.js is a single-line, heavily obfuscated file marked // @bun @bun-cjs with rotated string-array indirection and hex-scrambled identifier helpers (e.g. WV8StW, MmgoCP, _0xNNNN-style names); it is not referenced by the TypeScript sources or declared as a build artifact and is reachable only through the Bun-based launch path. The package presents itself as an account-settings SDK, a purpose unrelated to bootstrapping an alternate JavaScript runtime. This is the alternate-runtime dropper shape: shipping a Bun-only payload sidesteps Node-based scanners, and the obfuscated payload's real behavior is not recoverable from surface review. The dropper fires automatically on npm install with no user consent.

Source: ghsa-malware (bb6a2ae272bfa77db60895e776542f67f27cadf12c5125e3a9acc7793c7c7069)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.