MAL-2026-11667

npm/@or-sdk/adapters is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (09805f947683926288e40675cae1dbf96ed5cc9fd4fd94922773ff1164697a32)

package.json declares preinstall=node setup.mjs. setup.mjs is written in obfuscator.io style (variables like _0x488df8, string-proxy objects) and, at install time, either invokes an existing bun binary or downloads the Bun runtime v1.3.13 zip from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and runs the sibling file math_init.js under Bun via execFileSync. math_init.js is a 727KB single-line Bun-compiled bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs header) whose strings — including any network destinations, filesystem paths, and commands — are hidden behind a numeric string-array cipher (n7gIxM=[...]), an array-rotation function, and a base-N decoder, so its actual behavior is opaque to static inspection. The package presents itself as a thin @or-sdk adapter SDK but ships an alternate-runtime dropper: the harmful code is executed by a freshly downloaded second-language runtime rather than Node, bypassing Node-based supply-chain scanners. Obfuscation is applied both to the install loader and to the payload it executes, and the alternate runtime is fetched fresh on every install with no integrity check tying it to the package's declared purpose.

Source: ghsa-malware (45adcf99f97cf81ddf41ed76f11dca2ccf2ed9f1078439de1505b85a86e3e75d)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.