MAL-2026-11673

npm/@or-sdk/authorizer is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (67be33bd6a603edcf0997f5145412146e1bd782ced60495945afa4ee77db8dac)

The package declares scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs". setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style _0x-prefixed identifiers and per-function string-map objects hiding literals such as ldd, /etc/os-release, Alpine, unzip, powershell, and the Bun release URL). At install time it downloads the Bun runtime zip from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/..., extracts it to a temp directory, marks the binary executable, and invokes it via execFileSync on the sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB single-line Bun-compiled JavaScript blob (// @bun @bun-cjs) with string-array/control-flow-flattening obfuscation (shuffled string-array decoder WV8StW, numeric code tables, _0x identifiers); its plaintext behavior cannot be recovered without executing the Bun runtime. An OAuth authorizer SDK has no functional need to fetch an alternate JavaScript runtime and execute an obfuscated payload under it during installation. The alternate-runtime dropper pattern (executing the real payload only under a smuggled interpreter) bypasses Node-based static analysis of npm packages, and combined with obfuscation of both the loader and the payload, is a supply-chain attack shape. Installing the package causes arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine as a side effect of npm install, with concealed behavior.

Source: ghsa-malware (5818f84a7fbd156fafba71bd9eb09ac256dc705995760bc95d02affa76123ead)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.