MAL-2026-11675

npm/@or-sdk/billing is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (0ce1315badb433c5e3f6960c270788fea8a60dca1fd45fd297de2ba2a644f7a7)

@or-sdk/billing@27.2.3 declares scripts.preinstall pointing at setup.mjs, which downloads the Bun runtime from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/ into a temp directory (or uses a preexisting system bun) and then invokes it via execFileSync(bunBinary, [join(D, 'mathinit.js')]) against a sibling file mathinit.js. The sibling mathinit.js is a 727KB bundle (sha256 9fc2570b7cef51c1b8df116d144d11ff4096357be7d2c4c6367cfc2509cf1bcc) marked '// @bun @bun-cjs' and constructed with obfuscator.io-style techniques (a large mixed numeric/string constant table n7gIxM plus a rotator function WV8StW that shifts the array to reconstruct strings and opcodes at runtime), so its network, filesystem, and credential-touching behavior is not inspectable prior to execution. The package's advertised purpose is a Billing SDK, which does not require pulling a second language runtime at install time to execute an opaque 727KB payload named mathinit.js. Running the payload under Bun rather than Node also causes it to execute outside the visibility of Node-based supply-chain tooling. This is the alternate-runtime-dropper install-time-RCE shape: an unaudited, purpose-mismatched, heavily obfuscated blob is executed automatically on every npm install of the package.

Source: ghsa-malware (d74e19ab9be3ca81ab7ff0023df490cb132323aa688718a6b45c2f138ce7f487)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.