MAL-2026-11689

npm/@or-sdk/discovery is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (72e8361e28b12aa06fe815dccee98ee6532a905b4f2f58de2b3199ed85a36816)

The package's preinstall script runs node setup.mjs, which downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/... and then invokes execFileSync(bun, [path.join(D, 'math_init.js')]) to run a bundled 727KB sibling file with that alternate runtime at install time. Both setup.mjs and math_init.js are heavily obfuscated: setup.mjs uses _0x-style identifiers and lookup-table string encoding, and math_init.js (a Bun-compiled @bun-cjs bundle) uses a shuffled string/constants array with a rotation function and decoder that hides all embedded strings including any URLs, endpoints, or file paths. The advertised purpose of the package is a service-discovery SDK client, which does not require a second language runtime or an obfuscated install-time payload. Bringing in Bun as an alternate runtime to execute an opaque bundled sibling structurally bypasses Node-based install-time scanners; the payload's actual behavior is not inspectable from source. This matches the alternate-runtime-dropper install-time-RCE pattern: fetched runtime is used to execute code shipped in the tarball whose contents are hidden by obfuscation, unrelated to the package's declared function.

Source: ghsa-malware (b0531dd04216fed4931eea60875d9e0b333abba24c86d578c93b4ae7d02bd981)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.