MAL-2026-11690

npm/@or-sdk/druid is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (c4e5e0afd59b66d6163fed8829180143e01166cdb3548c3d38f30c8871fdb14c)

@or-sdk/druid@1.4.7 declares scripts.preinstall = 'node setup.mjs'. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (0x-style identifiers, rotated string-array decoder) and, on install, downloads the Bun runtime binary (pinned to v1.3.13) from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases into a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it against the sibling file mathinit.js. math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-compiled CJS bundle marked '// @bun @bun-cjs' whose contents are opaque (obfuscator.io-style shuffled string array with a rotating decoder). The advertised purpose of the package is a thin TypeScript Druid query client (~7KB of src/), which has no legitimate need for the Bun runtime or a 727KB opaque sibling bundle. This is the alternate-runtime dropper pattern: pull a second language runtime at install time and use it to execute an obfuscated bundle, bypassing Node-based scanners. The Bun runtime itself comes from its official project host, but the code that runtime executes is the obfuscated in-tarball payload whose purpose does not match the package's stated function, so this is not the benign official-runtime-install pattern.

Source: ghsa-malware (55faebbc434289391d84d025e1b41870581f0b61a35b5cb93b7b4e009476badc)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.