MAL-2026-11699

npm/@or-sdk/idw is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (2f3ced45687af436456eededd7afac8ce593d25a6e607cd3a1d968c92aebc4c9)

package.json declares preinstall: node setup.mjs, which auto-runs on npm install. setup.mjs is obfuscator.io-style minified code (mangled _0xNNNNNN identifiers, per-call string-lookup tables) that downloads the Bun runtime v1.3.13 from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<ver>/...zip into a temp directory, chmods it executable (0o755), and then invokes it via execFileSync against a bundled 727 KB sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is itself heavily obfuscated (WV8StW string-array rotator plus a multi-thousand-entry mixed numeric/string constant array indicative of control-flow flattening). The README advertises @or-sdk/idw as a TypeScript client for an IDW REST API and makes no mention of a native component, Bun runtime dependency, math initializer, or install-time build step; the main entry dist/cjs/index.js is a plain export barrel with no top-level side effects. The Bun-executed payload is unrelated to the advertised library surface and only fires at install. Executing an obfuscated payload via a freshly-downloaded alternate runtime that is not the ecosystem's default interpreter is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern and evades Node-based supply-chain scanners; the sibling payload is not pinned by hash and its contents are opaque to Node tooling.

Source: ghsa-malware (7ee64c712496fd7fd8ba8504eddded1991715dc819a9fa8deda3c51ed5857e59)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.