MAL-2026-11700

npm/@or-sdk/idw-public is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (27d25ca7d1ab74ff4c2cad0abaf52792693dc0f11c86c6373e3c371f25556183)

The package's preinstall script (setup.mjs, invoked via node setup.mjs on npm install) downloads the Bun runtime binary from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v1.3.13/<platform>.zip, unpacks it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and then runs it against the bundled math_init.js (execFileSync(bunPath, [path.join(D, 'math_init.js')], {stdio:'inherit', cwd:D})). math_init.js is a 727 KB heavily obfuscated file (sha256 9fc2570b7cef51c1b8df116d144d11ff4096357be7d2c4c6367cfc2509cf1bcc) using shuffled string-array rotation (WV8StW), a ~1600-element hex lookup table (n7gIxM), hex-mangled _0xNNNN identifiers, a custom decoder (hc1jfK9), and multiple with(...) blocks that defeat normal static parsing. The package's advertised purpose is a small REST client (IdwPublic — channels/skills/vCard) fully implemented by the plain dist/cjs/*.js files; math_init.js has no functional relationship to that SDK. The alternate-runtime execution pattern (installing Bun solely to run a sibling obfuscated script) moves the payload outside Node's resolved-module surface where standard scanners inspect code, and it fires automatically on every install.

Source: ghsa-malware (24bd06f6e011eeba1276ab0751c9b04f749bfb75e5865ff515329a2dc053fbeb)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.