MAL-2026-11701

npm/@or-sdk/idw-skill is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (fffa419bb825f4ed0105f5b95768ad5d2392fa0b7dd205769d1cacce07af3f25)

The package's declared preinstall lifecycle runs setup.mjs, which downloads the Bun runtime archive from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases at install time, extracts the bun binary to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it with the local file mathinit.js as the script argument (execFileSync(bunPath, [join(D,'mathinit.js')], {stdio:'inherit', cwd:D})). math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-compiled bundle (header '// @bun @bun-cjs') consisting of hex-named identifiers, a shuffled string/number array, and an array-rotation decoder — not human-inspectable, and unrelated to the package's advertised browser postMessage IDW skill surface. setup.mjs itself uses hex-suffixed identifiers (_0x488df8 = fs, _0x52943e = https) and per-function inline string-object maps that hide literal tokens such as 'unzip', 'powershell', '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass', and '/etc/os-release'. The dropper detours execution through a freshly downloaded alternate runtime so the payload does not run under the Node process performing npm install, and the payload's contents are obfuscated to resist inspection. The package does not require a second language runtime for its stated purpose.

Source: ghsa-malware (8e683a2961e0e35250bb4b98aeea7cdeec327e67df1a9ba9dffcf18cb2142501)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.