MAL-2026-11704

npm/@or-sdk/keys is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (85d0c043c4981ee8423f383608d6a98c3b24f63b6bef33cc21ffe0cfab356b7d)

package.json declares preinstall="node setup.mjs". setup.mjs is an obfuscated dropper (hex-mangled identifiers such as 0x488df8/0x52943e, per-function lookup objects mapping opaque keys to strings like "ldd", "/etc/os-release", "Alpine", "bun") that downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<V>/<archive>.zip (or reuses a bun on PATH), makes it executable, and invokes it against a sibling file mathinit.js in the package directory via execFileSync(bunPath, [mathinit.js], {cwd}). math_init.js is a 727KB obfuscator.io-style Bun-CJS bundle (banner // @bun @bun-cjs, rotated string array, custom-alphabet decoder function hc1jfK9, hex-named variables). The bundle is not part of the package's advertised Keys SDK API in dist/ and is reachable only through the preinstall path; because it runs under Bun rather than Node, Node-based scanners never observe its execution. Fetching an alternate runtime from an official vendor domain would normally be aggressive-but-legitimate, but here the runtime is the vehicle for executing an obfuscated, purpose-mismatched, package-shipped payload at install time, which is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern.

Source: ghsa-malware (6d8aa37a679e90c274b6fedd9e96e0921bf5a3af8c4435e177876c2346704ff8)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.