MAL-2026-11718

npm/@or-sdk/permissions-cli is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (adceff4e8e4d8b986975745aba3c4545e1bad160743f3043657cd62ede3dde9a)

The package declares scripts.preinstall = "node setup.mjs". setup.mjs is itself obfuscated with hex-named identifiers and string-lookup indirection; when invoked it checks for a local bun binary and, if absent, downloads Bun v1.3.13 from github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases, extracts and chmods it, then execFileSync's the downloaded bun against a sibling file mathinit.js. mathinit.js is a 727,680-byte single-line bundle marked // @bun @bun-cjs with a shuffled numeric/string constant array (n7gIxM) and mangled variable names — no source, no documentation, no relation to the advertised ~6KB permissions-YAML-uploader CLI. Fetching an alternate language runtime at install time solely to execute a large obfuscated sibling payload is the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern: the executed bytes are not the aggressive-but-legitimate case of installing a runtime to run the package's own transparent shipped code, and Node-based inspection tooling will not analyze the Bun-executed payload. The auto-execute-on-default-install gate is satisfied via the preinstall lifecycle hook, and the payload's purpose is opaque and mismatched to the package's stated function.

Source: ghsa-malware (df142a98b1ae6c11c999dbb9fe58c707dbddeec7a1e286d1abc99bd671dd2fd0)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.