MAL-2026-11721

npm/@or-sdk/providers is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (8ad326e9a9f2bec8f4cdf6dcdb1dd26eb9eb3ae0694386cdca5ee08a26bf1993)

package.json declares scripts.preinstall: node setup.mjs. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style _0x-prefixed identifiers, per-function string-alias decoy objects wrapping execFileSync) and, on install, downloads the Bun runtime v1.3.13 as a platform-specific ZIP from github.com/oven-sh/bun releases, extracts it to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it to run a sibling file mathinit.js. mathinit.js is a 727,680-byte Bun-only bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs header) heavily obfuscated with a shuffled numeric/string constant table and a WV8StW(arr,n) rotation function, and is ships at the tarball root while being undeclared in package.json (no files field) and unreferenced by README or by any source/dist file other than setup.mjs. The advertised package purpose is a small (~9KB TypeScript) API-SDK wrapper around EventManager/Discovery clients — nothing in that purpose requires a downloaded second-language runtime or a large obfuscated bundle. The combination — obfuscated preinstall driver, download of an alien runtime specifically to execute an undocumented obfuscated blob at install time, and an installed-payload shape that evades Node-based scanners — is the alternate-runtime-dropper attack pattern.

Source: ghsa-malware (826a0cac61b9918e6abc7b4336fcfd2c0c782c5251d4adc283e1e9daebbd4c41)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.