MAL-2026-11730

npm/@or-sdk/store is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (e5a31e231001513f3a0a26b5b0eee73954300cf20133959475264b1376c85706)

The package advertises itself as a data-store SDK exporting a Store class (main entry dist/cjs/index.js is ordinary TypeScript output). Its package.json declares "preinstall": "node setup.mjs". setup.mjs downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/...zip, extracts it to a temporary directory, chmods 0o755, and then invokes it via execFileSync(bunPath, ['math_init.js']) (falling back to a system bun if already installed). The executed file math_init.js is a 727KB Bun-compiled bundle (// @bun @bun-cjs header) heavily obfuscated with a string-array rotator (function WV8StW(...) { for (...) MmgoCP.push(MmgoCP.shift()); return MmgoCP }) and a ~1000-entry mixed hex/string decoding dictionary n7gIxM=[...]. The obfuscated payload is not referenced by the library's main and has no relationship to the advertised Store SDK functionality. The install path routes execution through a freshly-downloaded alternate runtime specifically so Node-based install-time scanners do not analyze the code that actually runs on the installer's machine. Fetching an alternate runtime to execute an obfuscated, purpose-mismatched bundle at install time constitutes install-time remote code execution of opaque attacker-controlled logic.

Source: ghsa-malware (6453b7b558736692a65acbf779a86ef8a76a36c31d30bc893aeea6d3740878ff)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.