MAL-2026-11732

npm/@or-sdk/tags is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (028b2ebc684d2f357cc848a867d5e4e0997a81185b0d825bcea2722b9a908448)

The package's npm preinstall hook runs node setup.mjs, which downloads a platform-specific Bun runtime binary from GitHub releases, extracts it to a temporary directory, marks it executable, and invokes it against a bundled 727KB obfuscated JavaScript file math_init.js (execFileSync(bunPath, [path.join(D, 'math_init.js')], { stdio: 'inherit', cwd: D })). Bun is not otherwise a documented dependency of a tags SDK, and the payload is not reachable via Node's normal require graph — it only runs because the preinstall script fetches an alternate runtime specifically to execute it. Both setup.mjs and math_init.js are heavily obfuscated: setup.mjs uses hex-named identifiers (_0x488df8, _0x52943e,...) and string-indirection objects to hide URL, path, and command literals, and math_init.js is a single-line file with a large rotating string/number constant array and short-variable obfuscation with no corresponding readable source under src/. The combination — lifecycle-hook fetch of a foreign language runtime, execution of an opaque bundled payload with no source-form counterpart, and heavy obfuscation of both the loader and the payload — matches the alternate-runtime-dropper pattern and produces arbitrary code execution on the installer's machine at npm install time, outside the visibility of Node-focused supply-chain tooling.

Source: ghsa-malware (ddbee2e92a8fe0e3c1be5ef9f7f6c5d2402fde868ee9b17ab489ad97b4146a78)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.