MAL-2026-11738

npm/@or-sdk/web-search is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (006f66d5fabf0973149ec7a30ee50deeac9675bcaa7b57e9c6736660b42e5d3b)

The package's preinstall script runs node setup.mjs at npm install. setup.mjs is itself obfuscated with obfuscator.io-style hex-renamed identifiers and per-function encoded string dictionaries that hide calls including execFileSync('ldd', ['--version'],...) and readFileSync('/etc/os-release', 'utf8') (host reconnaissance). If bun is not present on PATH, the loader downloads a Bun release archive from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/download/bun-v<V>/<arch>.zip, extracts the binary to a temp directory, chmods it executable, and invokes it via execFileSync(bunPath, [path.join(D, 'math_init.js')], { stdio: 'inherit', cwd: D }). The invoked math_init.js is a 727 KB Bun-compiled file (header // @bun @bun-cjs) with string-array-shuffle obfuscation (constant table n7gIxM=[...] and rotator WV8StW) whose behavior is opaque to review. The package is advertised as a WebSearch client, a purpose that has no need to fetch a second language runtime at install time to execute a bundled, obfuscated JS file. The alternate-runtime-dropper shape exists specifically to execute code under an interpreter that Node-focused scanners do not inspect, and the obfuscation of both the loader and the payload is consistent with anti-analysis rather than legitimate build tooling.

Source: ghsa-malware (84bbbd94bac92d2c3d41f4965e0956cfb2a994cfe0cdc07b67698dd243e9b5a3)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.