MAL-2026-11789

npm/@qlik/embed-react is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (1ae4e031b6db123b200aea44dc3d49ccc33b85d3e74750d66e119f8c1929ea3e)

Version 2.5.3 declares a preinstall script (node setup.mjs) that runs automatically on npm install. setup.mjs is obfuscator.io-style obfuscated (hex-mangled identifiers such as _0x488df8, per-function string-lookup tables) and downloads the Bun runtime from https://github.com/oven-sh/bun/releases/, extracts and chmod +x's the binary in a temp directory, then invokes it via execFileSync(bunPath, [math_init.js]) to run a sibling file. math_init.js is a 727 KB single-line, heavily obfuscated payload using string-array shift-rotator obfuscation (WV8StW) with a 3000+ entry constant table (n7gIxM) and hex-mangled identifiers. The naming (math_init) is unrelated to the package's advertised React-embed purpose, and executing the payload under a freshly downloaded alternate runtime (Bun) evades scanners that only inspect Node-resolved code. The payload runs unconditionally on install with no verification, no pinning to a documented publisher artifact, and no relationship to any legitimate build step for a React embed library.

Source: ghsa-malware (d1a237054928315e5062c5a665f25fd944520d9d735bd60a0179c9ffb211c7ac)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.