MAL-2026-11959

npm/@umacloud/cli-win32-x64 is affected by the large-scale, self-propagating npm supply-chain worm of 2026-08-04 (the "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again" wave) — the same campaign that began with the compromise of the keyv and cacheable maintainer account. The listed version(s) were trojanized and republished by the worm after it reached an npm publish token belonging to a maintainer in this namespace; the payload enumerates every package a stolen token controls and republishes each with the same hook, so many packages under this scope were poisoned in the same short window. Every poisoned release adds a preinstall hook ("preinstall": "node setup.mjs") that runs on a bare npm install, before any project code. setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime and runs a byte-identical, heavily obfuscated ~728 KB second-stage credential stealer (shipped as MathSymbol.js / mathinit.js). It harvests GitHub, npm, AWS, GCP, Azure, HashiCorp Vault and Kubernetes credentials plus generic secrets and private keys (TruffleHog-style sweep), reads CI/CD secrets and identifies build runners, then republishes further packages the stolen token can reach. Rather than a fixed command-and-control host, it exfiltrates stolen findings to attacker-created GitHub repositories (descriptions reading "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again") and over DNS. Treat any environment that installed an affected version (with install scripts enabled) as compromised: rotate and revoke all reachable credentials (npm and GitHub tokens, cloud keys, Vault/Kubernetes secrets, and CI org/repo secrets). Part of the August 2026 npm worm that poisoned 400+ packages across many organizations.

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Source: amazon-inspector (80838db84b5b15acc3d9de3c95f63b9ddafb8f278ab6621ae471ce9010701c5a)

On npm install, the package's preinstall script (node setup.mjs) downloads the Bun runtime from the oven-sh/bun GitHub releases, extracts it to a temp directory, chmod +x's it, and uses it to execute a bundled sibling file math_init.js. math_init.js is a 727KB single-line file with string-array shuffle obfuscation, a large numeric constant table, and a character-map decoder; its name (math_init) does not correspond to its contents. The loader setup.mjs is itself obfuscator.io-style transformed (hex-name locals, string-lookup dictionaries, indirection wrappers) rather than a plain download/unzip/exec helper. package.json declares "files": ["bin/"], so the declared publish surface excludes both setup.mjs and math_init.js, yet both ship at the tarball root and are invoked by the preinstall hook — reviewers reading the manifest alone would not see the executed code. Although package.json declares "os": ["win32"], setup.mjs contains full Linux (including Alpine/musl detection via ldd --version and /etc/os-release) and macOS branches for downloading Bun, indicating the same install-time chain is shared across sibling @umacloud/cli-* platform packages. Executing the payload under Bun rather than Node bypasses Node-oriented supply-chain scanning, and the obfuscation prevents inspection of what runs on the installer's machine.

Source: ghsa-malware (2e006ccc9f6c8df2630729bbb86ca740bb0416294374584b76f0c5d3998d3f87)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.