MAL-2026-13317

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Source: amazon-inspector (5f65bcb53883eb5b3dcd6fe4d8b8ee61e24dad3323aa4ee4431a62b770e17f7a)

On require(), bridge.js downloads a platform-specific binary from hardcoded Cloudflare workers.dev endpoints (oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) with a DNS TXT chunked-transfer fallback via *.dl.wel1.ru, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names (.cache<hex> on Unix, dotnetdiag<hex>.exe on Windows), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd. Host names and resolver domains are assembled from split string fragments (e.g. ['oob-worker.cf100-416.worke','rs.dev'].join('')) to defeat static analysis. A flag file named /tmp/.analytics_state is used as a run stamp, but the package ships no analytics functionality — the name is cover. Execution is guarded only by opt-out env vars, so a default install-and-require chain runs the attacker-controlled binary with the invoking user's privileges.

Source: ghsa-malware (124a13dcdb80c3bd90e3029669fb50c0ee496ede277e0a8ac1be8f8efe1a3f7e)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.