-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
On require, index.js serializes the full process.env together with hostname, username, homedir, platform, cwd, and package metadata, base64-encodes the payload, and sends it via an HTTPS GET to api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/sendMessage with a hardcoded chat_id (8969499041). A marker file in the OS tmpdir suppresses repeat sends. The package presents itself as a drop-in replacement for @solana/spl-token and attempts to require and re-export the real @solana/spl-token so consumers see functional behavior while the exfiltration has already fired. Bulk process.env harvest at import time captures whatever credentials the installer's Node process has in environment — cloud keys, CI/publish tokens, database URLs — none of which relate to any legitimate SPL/Solana utility function. The typosquat name (spl-token-utils vs @solana/spl-token) makes accidental installs likely.
{
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"versions": [
"1.4.2"
],
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-015780",
"import_time": "2026-08-05T16:13:44.461778488Z",
"modified_time": "2026-08-05T15:39:00Z",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"sha256": "f95b625c92e85b1c0d5c10a192c70f8f82cf8d3b2ac7b66c034635b680785654"
}
]
}[
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature."
}
]
{
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "spl-token-utils-1.4.2.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha512_sri": "sha512-C6kn6gm9Zu15m5rPCeczJgi/MYZmPNtntI7E4M7GGncdbVpgRVnwHpNz1UvHY7oE+EyDSj0rf+N11tj/GQunoA==",
"sha1": "dbd09f3b9ee447dc59ab65a5de488c532d4b5b9b"
}
}
],
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "index.js",
"tlsh": "4221229c27f1ba4e12326492652f610a72bbc9f10488f654d598d1c73f702c8da66798",
"sha256": "7e9343c88b6d2f9c864022f72b3630afc7d8fb8f32f507cbfd92b171aee7471c"
}
]
}
"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/spl-token-utils/MAL-2026-13351.json"