MAL-2026-13771

boring-vault is a malicious npm package that impersonates the BoringVault smart-contract framework. It carries no legitimate functionality; the published tarball contains only a package.json and an install-time payload (index.js). Both preinstall and postinstall run node index.js || true, so the code executes automatically when the package is installed.

Version 1.0.0 harvests environment variables whose names match KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASS|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|RPC|AWS|GITHUB|NPM|KUBE|VAULT|AUTH|PGP|GPG|SEED|WALLET, the contents of ~/.npmrc and ~/.gitconfig, and directory listings of ~/.ssh, ~/.foundry/keystores, ~/.config/hardhat, and ~/.config/gcloud, along with the hostname, username, working directory, and platform. The collected JSON is exfiltrated via an HTTPS POST to https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09. Errors are swallowed so the install never visibly fails.

Version 1.1.0, published roughly 2.5 hours after 1.0.0 for all six packages within the same ~9-second window, reads full file contents (up to 4000 bytes) instead of just listing them. New targets include .aws/credentials, .aws/config, .ssh/id_rsa, .ssh/id_ed25519, .ssh/config, .kube/config, .docker/config.json, .netrc, .pgpass, .pypirc, .git-credentials, and two GCP credential files (application_default_credentials.json and legacy_credentials) — the ~/.config/gcloud directory listing is still collected too. It also reads local .env, .env.local, .env.production, .env.development, and secrets.env files from the working directory, and adds cryptocurrency wallet theft: key files from Solana, Anchor, NEAR, and Sui wallet paths, plus the first three files under ~/.foundry/keystores. The credential regex gains BEARER, API, INFURA, ALCHEMY, HELIUS, QUICKNODE, ANKR, and PRIVATE_KEY to catch RPC and API provider tokens. Both versions exfiltrate to the same webhook.site endpoint.

In 1.0.0, index.js opens with a fake comment claiming it is @plumenetwork/nest-artifacts, an unrelated install-time shim — @plumenetwork/nest-artifacts is not itself a malicious package, just a leftover label from whatever template the attacker reused across this batch, published by npm account mssjeep843. The fake comment was removed in 1.1.0. Five sibling packages from the same account impersonate Euler's EVC, Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, and the BoringVault pattern, sharing this same webhook.site endpoint, byte-identical payload template, and 1.0.0-to-1.1.0 escalation. Two further packages from the same account (PyPI dlmm and dlmm-sdk, impersonating Meteora's DLMM SDK) ran an equivalent harvester and are tracked separately as MAL-2026-13728 and MAL-2026-13729.

Any environment that installed either version should rotate the exposed secrets and treat harvested keys as compromised, prioritizing wallet private keys and RPC/API tokens if 1.1.0 was installed.

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Source: amazon-inspector (42afd2d2d4bfb9b6b45e5aa124032b4314f394a73e5552851a4083f984dc5d21)

The package's preinstall and postinstall hooks execute index.js, which reads classic installer-secret paths (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.foundry/keystores,.env files) and scrapes environment variables matching a broad credential regex (KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASS|PRIVATE|MNEMONIC|RPC|AWS|GITHUB|NPM|ANKR|...). The collected data is serialized and sent via a detached child process that sleeps 60-240 seconds before POSTing JSON to https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09, a hardcoded non-first-party endpoint, so exfiltration outlives the install-time process. The script also contains sandbox-evasion checks that bail out on hostnames matching scan-/detonation/sandbox/ubuntu-fc-uvm, users named scan/nonroot/sandbox, environments containing honey/canarytokens strings, and npm mirror registries. The package name references an unrelated legitimate project; the shipped code is a credential stealer.