MAL-2026-15540

-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-

Source: amazon-inspector (ec25e8ea6f31c47fb8d4f491a39477d5fde2b00f41c3c1b19960931a34f990e6)

package.json declares a dependency whose key ("mkt-ui-library") equals the package's own name and whose value is a bare HTTPS URL, https://repo.securityctrl.com/mkt-ui-library, instead of a registry version range. On npm install, npm fetches whatever tarball is served at that URL and installs it, executing any lifecycle scripts inside it, with no version pin and no integrity check. The shipped source is an inert stub (index.js only performs a console.log), so the manifest line is the entire payload: whoever controls repo.securityctrl.com controls the code that runs on the installer's machine. The self-referencing dependency name (key equals the package's own name at an implausibly high version 45.0.0) is a dependency-confusion shape that biases resolvers toward this artifact over any legitimate internal package.

Source: ghsa-malware (6c92a8e23c27f6e42fd9a6ef7d70e015f23a88062a9e410e7f04c7858493d1c5)

Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.