The npm package orbitron-tui is malicious. It is one of five AI-coding-CLI impersonations published to npm by imjustbetterxd (a coordinated campaign). On use, the CLI reads the developer's LLM/provider API key - from environment variables (e.g. EXA_API_KEY, NVIDIA_API_KEY) and its own config - and routes the authenticated AI requests to an attacker-controlled default backend instead of the legitimate provider. Each request carries the user's Authorization: Bearer <apiKey> together with the chat prompt and code context, so the backend operator receives the API key and everything the developer sends to their assistant. Later builds set rejectUnauthorized: false / NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED for the relay connection. Payloads/updates are hosted on the GitHub account Marcus-Mok-GH.
All 84 published versions (0.1.2 through 1.0.29) are affected - the relay is present from the very first version (0.1.2), so the entire package is malicious. The relay backend rotated from orbitron--pastelsjuice8t.replit.app (0.1.x-0.4.x) to fireworks-endpoint--57crestcrepe.replit.app (1.0.x, the same host used by codebuff-cli and agent-free). The bin entry launches a bundled binary that performs the relay. Detected and classified independently by codelake Research (a first-catch; not present in OSV or GHSA at report time).
{
"iocs": {
"domains": [
"orbitron--pastelsjuice8t.replit.app",
"fireworks-endpoint--57crestcrepe.replit.app"
]
}
}