MAL-2026-17383

This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated w:mex FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join.

The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork.

The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.

Affected package: @xatancchii/velycxbail (npm), version(s): 1.1.0.

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Source: amazon-inspector (594062e4a945ccd7c67e7a5f03085fbd2eecda766d5347b81e7012399fb1f447)

package.json declares "libsignal": "npm:@bellaxchuu/libsignal-node@latest", aliasing the Signal-protocol crypto dependency to a package published under the unrelated @bellaxchuu scope with the mutable latest tag and no integrity check. Every npm install of @xatancchii/velycxbail resolves libsignal to whatever the current head of @bellaxchuu/libsignal-node is at install time. The aliased package is consumed by lib/Utils/crypto.js, which is reached from the main entry through the Utils layer, so arbitrary future content published to that third-party scope loads and executes as part of normal use. The scope does not match the Baileys/WhatsApp publisher chain the fork claims to derive from, so control over the code path executed on installers rests with an unrelated third party.