This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical
forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into
the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated w:mex FOLLOW
query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter
JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the
victim's account to channels it never asked to join.
The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork.
The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.
Affected package: shadowmd (npm), version(s): 8.6.87.
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
lib/Socket/messages-send.js at lines 425 and 436 reconstructs the URL https://fiora.nixel.my.id/ from a String.fromCharCode decimal-ASCII array rather than a plain string literal. The host is assembled inside the package's WhatsApp socket message-send code path, so on every message-send flow the runtime resolves to an off-host destination whose identity is hidden from source-level inspection. Obfuscated destination reconstruction in a messaging library's send path is the fingerprint of a Baileys-family fork that intercepts or mirrors session/message data through an author-controlled endpoint; the destination fiora.nixel.my.id is unrelated to the WhatsApp protocol and is not documented as a caller-configurable endpoint.
{
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020933",
"import_time": "2026-10-04T23:40:43.451168613Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-04T23:22:05Z",
"sha256": "926dc7dcc164af51175755e81a7a6eabb878244ecc173974ab577a1569ce1ff4",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"8.6.87"
]
}
]
}[
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
]
{
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "lib/Socket/messages-send.js",
"sha256": "a62ea8d3d1172824095369efa66412a189a70812354a8d5790b4e9d50004a376",
"tlsh": "ee63926508fb192a4623b0b57e6bb401b134d0077148ec69ff8c86e85f8a464e6f7bdd"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "shadowmd-8.6.87.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "c0fdb25db5797debf63f6865af9d3db6db402aa0",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-gRum9B4++CHkds2kFjqAZKnUsnBNsrvtCq4Jfkmv0NaQjSec5uozgFMH30ibLZxtm1L4ueqpPy7P9HfT+dZQdg=="
}
}
]
}
"https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/main/osv/malicious/npm/shadowmd/MAL-2026-17405.json"